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Abstract
This paper develops a framework to explore firm corruption taking account of
interaction with an auditor. The basic idea is that an auditor can provide auditing
and other (consultancy) services. The extent of the other services depends on firm
profitability. Hence auditor profitability can increase with firm corruption that may
provide an incentive to collude in corrupt practices. This basic idea is developed
using a game theoretic framework. It is shown that a multiplicity of equilibria
exist from stable corruption, through auditor controlled corruption, via multiple
equilibria to honesty on behalf of both actors. Following the development of the
model various policy options are highlighted that show the difficulty of completely
removing corrupt practices.
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1 Introduction
A characteristic feature of the economic literature on corruption is that this is viewed as a
state oriented problem to which firms respond; see, for example, Rose-Ackerman (1999).
Other studies relate corruption to growth, poverty or governance aspects, especially
for the case of developing countries; see, for instance, Bhagwati (1982). In a context
similar to that analysed by Rose-Ackerman (1999), Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin
(2006) analyse corruption and collusion in procurement. They argue that a corrupt
agent would be willing to “sell” his decision in return for a bribe. They conclude that
collusion is more likely to take place within auctions in cases where firms are small
relative to the market. They also argue that the risks of collusion and of corruption
need to be addressed simultaneously. Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006, p. 884)
argue that:
Besides empirical evidence, there are theoretical issues motivating the study
of links between collusion and corruption. First, any cartel must solve a series
of problems including agreeing how to share the spoils, securing enforcement,
and deterring entry[...] A corrupt auctioneer can contribute to solving some
of these problems, for example by providing means of retaliation to secure
enforcement or creating barriers to entry. Second, corrupt auctioneers might
seek to extract rents.
This idea that an external agent is necessary for the stability of corruption and extracts
rents in generating this stability is used in this paper. But the emphasis is shifted
from the external agent being an auctioneer to being an auditor. On the same theme
Svensson (2005) recognises that corruption can also involve, for example, collusion be-
tween firms or misuse of corporate assets. This latter approach is adopted here, and
concentrates on corrupt practices within the private firm sector. In particular a game
theoretic framework is developed that examines incentives for firms to be corrupt given
market based monitoring by auditors. This general idea of a game theoretic approach
to corruption is, of course, not original. Carilllo (2000) constructs a dynamic model of
corruption within which agents are aware of their “propensity for corruption” and their
clients choose an optimal level of bribe to be offered. Such a framework provides an ex-
planation for different implicit prices for illegal services (bribes or kick-backs) for similar
countries (or organisations within similar countries), based on an analysis of reaction of
clients. Two of these ideas are carried forward into the current discussion: that there
is a propensity for corruption and that the reactions of other agents (here auditors) are
important for the equilibria that can be generated. Specifically firm level corruption
has been a significant problem, and so is worthy of further analysis. Between 1997 and
2002 nearly 10 per cent of US listed companies restated their earnings at least once
due to accounting irregularities (cited in Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005). In addition,
earnings restatements because of financial irregularities in the USA reached 414 cases
in 2004 (cited in Coffee, 2005). These irregularities provide a context to the current
discussion in a manner that is perhaps more informative than famous headline cases of
firm corruption. They provide background for the opinion expressed by Jensen (2006,
p. 14) while discussing the overvaluation of equity in the late 1990s and early 2000s
In part the massive overvaluation of equity that occurred was an under-
standable market mistake. Society seems to overvalue what is new. But
this catastrophic overvaluation was also the result of misleading data from
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managers, large numbers of naive investors, and breakdowns in the agency
relationship within companies, in investment banks, and in Audit and law
firms many of whom knowingly contributed to the misinformation that fed
the overvaluation.
A similar view is presented by Stiglitz (2003). While discussing Enron (Stiglitz, 2003,
p.244) he suggests that
Enron used accounting tricks that were increasingly becoming standard. It
appears that its chief financial officer made the same discovery that so many
other corporate executives made during the nineties: the same accounting
tricks that could be used to distort information to boost stock market prices
could be used to enrich themselves at the expense of other shareholders.
Key issues emerge from the Jensen-Stiglitz opinions cited here. Firm corruption involves
(a) a breakdown in agency relationships; (b) misleading activity not only by managers
but also by (for example) audit firms; and (c) “accounting tricks” that were increasingly
becoming standard. But given (a), (b) and (c) it is apparent that only some firms were
corrupt, even though (following Stiglitz) the “tricks” were becoming standard. The
414, or 10 per cent, cases of earnings restatements is a significant number but a small
proportion of the total number of US firms. Hence many firms decided not to do what
was apparently “standard” practice. A preliminary conclusion might therefore suggest
itself: that a breakdown in agency relationships is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for firm corruption. Sufficiency would appear to require (a) an agency breakdown in the
relationship between firms and their owners; (b) a willingness on the part of firms to
exploit this and engage in “tricks”; and (c) collusion by supporting actors (e.g. auditing
firms) in the “tricks”. In this paper a framework is developed that assumes agency
breakdown has occurred and explores the possibility of firms exploiting this and collusion
by auditing firms. The basic idea in this framework is that firm corruption involves
collusion between firms and auditors. But a central problem exists in this relationship:
auditors provide auditing and other consultancy services. The extent of these ‘other’
services depends on firm profitability i.e. the ability to buy them. In turn, firm and
auditor profitability increases with corruption. This can provide an incentive for not
only firm corruption but also auditor collusion in this corruption. The core problem
analysed in this paper has, of course been recognised by other authors. For example
Posner (2006, p. 11) gives a characteristically pithy summary of the core idea for the
current discussion:
Corporate executives, moreover, hire and pay the auditors who certify the
correctness of the corporation’s financial statements, dangle consulting con-
tracts in front of auditors who also offer consulting services
In brief, a game theoretic framework is developed here that is used to examine whether,
and in what circumstances, stable, equilibrium corruption is possible. The structure of
the paper is as follows. In the next section key assumptions involved with a corruption
game are developed. In section three explicit payoffs are specified. Following this, in
section four, the equilibria in the corruption game are explored. Section five explores
possible policy implications. Finally, brief conclusions are drawn. The final substantive
section of the discussion highlights a number of key policy conclusions that follow from
the framework developed here.
4
2 The corruption game
In this paper we consider the scenario of a firm that has the option of pursuing a profit-
making corrupt prospect in the knowledge that such corrupt activity would be detected
by its auditor. However, the firm also purchases consultancy services from the auditor.
We consider whether there are conditions under which corruption may be an equilibrium
and examine the effectiveness of various regulatory policy interventions in dealing with
corruption. We now set out the precise framework of the corruption game.
A 1. The game has two players: a Monopolist (M) and an Auditor (A).
A 2. Each player’s action set has two elements: Corrupt (C) or Honest (H).
Corollary 1. Given the action set {C,H} we rule out the possibility that the Audi-
tor could mislead the regulatory authorities by indicating that the Monopolist has been
corrupt when it has not been corrupt.
A 3. The players choose their actions sequentially over two periods: the Monopolist is
assumed to be the leader and the Auditor the follower. Hence, with subscripts denoting
the period {1, 2}, we have:
Period 1: M chooses {C1, H1};
Period 2: A chooses [. . . , {C2, H2}].
Corollary 2. It follows from A1 and A2 that retaliation by the Monopolist to {C1, H2}
is ruled out in this game.
This restriction of the model seems reasonable because if the Monopolist sacks the
Auditor for failing to support a corrupt strategy this would involve public disclosure of
the corruption. The implication of this assumption is that we can restrict analysis to a
two-stage, rather than three-stage, game.
A 4. The game is one of complete and symmetric information.
When the Auditor selects its action, {C1, H1} is known. In addition, this assumption
allows the use of backward induction to solve the game.
A 5. There is an exogenous non-corrupt gross profit for the Monopolist:
ΠHM > 0.
Thus corruption does not affect the profit attributable to the firm’s underlying ac-
tivity.
A 6. The players are risk neutral and expected profit maximisers.
A 7. (i) The firm buys (compulsory) Auditing services and additional consultancy ser-
vices from the Auditor. (ii) Ex-ante the returns to the consultancy services are uncer-
tain. As both agents are risk neutral they share this risk with a contract that has payment
based upon expected returns. (iii) A constant proportion α ∈ [0, 1) of the Monopolist’s
profit is allocated to purchase Auditor consultancy services. (iv) The Monopolist’s gross
non-corrupt profit reflects productive and market characteristics and benefits from these
Auditor services. The Monopolist’s net non-corrupt profit is therefore:
ΠM{H1, . . .} ≡ ΠHM (1− α).
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A 8. (i) The Monopolist has an opportunity to undertake corrupt activities to the value
γ(g)ΠHM . The parameter g measures the extent of the corrupt activity relative to the
exogenous non-corrupt gross Monopoly profit. (ii) The return to the corrupt activity γ(g)
is continuous and concave on g, reflecting diminishing returns: γ(g) > 0, γ′′(g) ≤ 0,
∀g ∈ (0,∞). (iii) Corruption produces an additional gross (before taking into account
consultancy fees and any penalties for detected corruption) profit gain to the Monopolist
over the non-corrupt gross Monopoly profit:
ΠCM ≡ (1 + γ(g))ΠHM .
It is important to note that the level of corruption g in A8 is not a (continuous)
choice variable of the Monopolist, rather, the Monopolist faces a discrete choice between
not being corrupt {H1, . . .} and pursuing a corrupt prospect, under {C1, . . .}, of value
σ(g)ΠHM . This reflects the fact that in many cases a firm may have a limited set of
opportunities for corrupt activities making g discrete rather than continuous.
A 9. (i) In the case in which both players choose to be corrupt, the payoff to each agent
is uncertain as Nature assigns a probability σ(g) to the corrupt activity being detected
and a strictly positive penalty being imposed on both Monopolist (FM > 0) and Auditor
(FA > 0). (ii) Under {C1, H2}, the monopolist incurs the penalty FM with certainty.
Remark 1. A9(ii) follows logically given Corollary 1 and A4.
Corollary 3. It follows from A6 and A9 that the players’ payoffs following Nature’s ac-
tions under {C1, C2} can be represented by an “expected” payoff with probability weights
σ(g) and 1− σ(g).
We now introduce the first of a number of critical values of g that will be helpful in
developing the results of the game.
Definition 1. gˆ ≡ inf(g : σ(g) = 1).
A 10. The probability of corruption being detected under {C1, C2} depends upon the level
of Monopolist corruption, g, with σ(0) = 0 and according to the corruption detection
profile σi(g) (i = 1, 2) where either (i) σ1(g) ∈ [0, 1], where σ′1(g) > 0 and σ′′1(g) > 0
for ∀g ∈ [0, gˆ) and σ′1(g) = 0 for ∀g ∈ [gˆ,∞) and gˆ > 0 or (ii) σ2(g) ∈ [0, 1) where
σ′2(g) > 0, σ′′2(g) < 0 and limg→∞ σ2(g) = T where T ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, in either case, σ(g) is positive monotonic for σ(g) < 1, which would appear
to be reasonable as higher levels of g are likely to be more conspicuous and hence more
likely to be detected. The conditions regarding the second derivatives in these definitions
are necessary to ensure that the functions σ(g) and ω(g) (defined later) cross only once
on their upward sloping segments. This “well behaved” property helps to facilitate
transparency in the model and keep the analysis manageable. If, with relatively simple
functional forms and simple interactions between these functions, unusual results arise
then this will be of greater interest than if the model were so complex that it could
support any outcome however unusual.
Corollary 4. gˆ is not defined under corruption detection profile σ2(g).
The following assumption is a logical extension of the Monopolist ‘non-retaliation’
and Auditor ‘non-misleading’ properties of the model (see Corollaries 2 and 1 respec-
tively).
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A 11. The payoffs to each player under {H1, C2} are the same as under {H1, H2}:
Πi{H1, C2} ≡ Πi{H1, H2} i = {M,A}.
Costs are mostly not specified explicitly within the model (they play an unspecified
role in ΠHM and ω(g), defined later), however, the following assumption introduces a cost
differential for the Auditor under corruption relative to honest behaviour.
A 12. The Auditor incurs a cost cA of supplying services to the Monopolist. These
costs are higher under {C1, C2} than under {. . . , H2}, respectively cCA and cHA . The cost
differential is defined 4c ≡ cCA − cHA and is assumed (i) to be positive and constant (not
a function of the level of corruption) and, (ii) 4c < αFm.
We argue that the positive differential is a sensible assumption given the higher trans-
action costs involved with hiding corrupt practices. The constancy of this differential
is not as problematic as it may appear, the reason being that we are only interested in
comparisons over no corruption and a given level of corruption - the level of corruption
is not a continuous choice variable.
As we see later, A12(ii) ensures that the set of values of g for which the Auditor
would support corruption is non-empty.
The game is illustrated in extensive form in Figure 1. Nodes M and N relate to the
Monopolist and Nature, respectively, and nodes A1 and A2 relate to the Auditor. Payoffs
are reported in parentheses - the single payoff following N is explained in Corollary 3.
Insert Figure 1 here.
Some further useful characteristics of the game are outlined below, their purpose will
become apparent later.
Definition 2. Let ϕ(σ) ≡ σ1−σFA + 4c1−σ .
Lemma 1. ϕ(σ) is: (i) positive monotonic, (ii) convex in σ, and (iii) limσ→1− ϕ(σ) =
∞.
Proof. It follows from A9 and A12(i) that FA and ∆c are strictly positive, hence (i)
ϕ′(σ) = FA1−σ +
σFA+4c
(1−σ)2 > 0 and (ii) ϕ
′′(σ) = 2 FA
(1−σ)2 + 2
σFA+4c
(1−σ)3 > 0. (iii) Since FA and
4c are exogenous and finite, limσ→1− 11−σ = 0, and so limσ→1− ϕ(σ) =∞.
The L.H.S of Figure 2, which we will see later captures the relevant information
relating to the Auditor’s decision, illustrates ϕ(σ). The R.H.S. of Figure 2 is concerned
with parameters affecting the Monopolist’s decision of which Definition 3 introduces a
key aspect.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Definition 3. Let ω(g) ≡ ΠHMFM γ(g). We refer to ω(g) as the Monopolist’s corruption
technology profile.
Lemma 2. ω(g) is (i) continuous, and (ii) concave.
Proof. Given ΠHM and FM are strictly positive and exogenous, the proof follows from
the properties of γ(g) in A8(ii).
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We now define further key values of g, examples of which are illustrated in Figure 2.
Definition 4. Let (i) g∗ be the discrete level of corruption available to the Monopolist
under {C1, . . .}, (ii) g∗∗ ≡ (g : ϕ(σ(g)) = αFM ).
We will see in the next Section that g∗∗ defines the level of corruption which produces
a detection probability under which the Auditor is indifferent between {C1, H2} and
{C1, C2} and that for g∗ < (>)g∗∗ the Auditor would support (not support) a corrupt
Monopolist.
Remark 2. There exist feasible profiles σ(g) for which g∗∗ is not defined. However, it
follows from A12(ii) that if g∗∗ is defined it always yields σ(g∗∗) ∈ (0, 1).
Definition 5. Let (i) g˜ ≡ inf(g : ω(g) = 1); (ii) ˜˜g ≡ sup(g : ω(g) = 1); (iii) g¯ ≡
inf(g : ω(g) = σ(g), g ∈ R++); (iv) g¯ ≡ sup(g : ω(g) = σ(g), g ∈ R++); (v) gmax ≡ (g :
arg maxω(g)).
Having introduced various critical values of g in the model, we can now outline the
relationships between the level of Monopolist corruption and the return to corruption.
Definition 6. We define three categories of the Monopolist’s corruption technology pro-
file, ωi(g) (i = a, b, c). In addition to the conditions placed upon ω(g) from A8(ii), we
have that: (i) ωa(g) ≡ (ω : ω′(g) > 0,∀g ∈ [0,∞); limg→∞ ω(g) > 1); (ii) ωb(g) ≡ (ω :
ω′(g) > 0,∀g ∈ [0, gmax);ω′(g) < 0, ∀g ∈ (gmax,∞);ω(gmax) ≥ 1); (iii) ωc(g) ≡ (ω :
ω′(g) > 0, ∀g ∈ [0,∞); limg→∞ ω(g) = S, S ∈ (0, 1)).
Insert Figure 3 here.
Given the characterisations of ω(g) in Definition 6 and σ(g) in A10, we now set
out five cases describing different possible relationships between ω(g) and σ(g) in the
following Definition.
Definition 7. (i) Case1: σ′1(0) > ω′(0); (ii) Case2: σ′1(0) < ω′(0) and ∃gˆ and g¯ s.t.
gˆ > g¯; (iii) Case3: σ′1(0) < ω′(0) and ∃g˜, gˆ s.t. g˜ ≤ gˆ; (iv) Case4: σ′2(0) < ω′(0) and
g¯ may exist but not g¯ 6= g¯; (v) Case5: σ′2(0) > ω′(0) and g¯ may exist but not g¯ 6= g¯.
The list of Cases outlined in Definition 7 is not intended to be exhaustive. There are
many obvious, though uninteresting, ways of extending the Cases but we have tried to
keep them to a minimum in order to allow us to explore the equilibria arising from the
model with reasonably well-behaved functions. In particular, we have explicitly limited
the number of times ω(g) and σ(g) can cross. The more complicated the scenarios the
more arbitrary the predictions. Examples of the Cases1-3 are illustrated in Figure 4.
Lemma 3. Under corruption technology ωc(g) Case3 is not defined.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the the requirement in Case 3 of the existence
of gˆ in Definition 7(iii), which is ruled out under corruption technology ωc(g) since, by
Lemma 2(ii) ωc(g) is concave and by Definition 6 (iii) limg→∞ < 1.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Definition 7 (iv) and (v) ensure that there is a limit to the number of times the
ωi(g) and σ2(g) functions can cross. The following Remark makes it clear that the
assumptions of the model also ensure similar crossing properties between the ωi(g) and
σ2(g) functions.
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Remark 3. Given ω(g) is strictly concave and σ1(g) is strictly convex for g ∈ (0, g˜),
then: (i) σ′1(0) > ω′(0) in Case 1 implies σ′1(0) > ω′(0) ∀g ∈ (0, g˜); (ii) ω(g) and σ1(g)
in Case 2 cross exactly once for g ∈ (0, g˜).
For the analysis in Section 4 it is useful to make a distinction between Perfect Nash
Equilibria (PNE ) corruption profiles that are effectively unconstrained and those that
are constrained. The following Definition makes explicit what is meant in each Case.
Definition 8. (i) A PNE is said to support unconstrained corruption if corruption
is PNE for ∀g ∈ [a,∞) where a ∈ R++; (ii) A PNE is said to support constrained
corruption if g ∈ [a, b] is PNE where a and b are finite, a, b ∈ R++ and a ≤ b.
Finally, it is also useful to classify Cases where corruption is guaranteed to be an
equilibrium for sufficiently small levels of g∗.
3 Payoff Specification and equilibria
This section will specify an explicit payoff structure for the corruption game set out
above. First, from A5, A7 and A11, the payoffs corresponding to z in Figure 1 are:
zM ≡ ΠM{H1, H2} ≡ ΠM{H1, C2} ≡ (1− α)ΠHM , (1a)
zA ≡ ΠA{H1, H2} ≡ ΠA{H1, C2} ≡ α(1− α)ΠHM − cHA . (1b)
Given A9, if the Auditor does not collude in the corruption the Monopolist will face
a punishment cost of FM with certainty. Given A7 and A8 the payoffs corresponding to
y in Figure 1 are:
yM ≡ ΠM{C1, H2} ≡ (1− α)[(1 + γ(g))ΠHM − FM ], (2a)
yA ≡ ΠA{C1, H2} ≡ α[(1 + γ(g))ΠHM − FM ]− cHA . (2b)
If the Auditor colludes in the corruption the probability of corruption being detected
is σ(g), by A10. By A9, if the Auditor is found to be corrupt there is a punishment cost
of FA. Hence, given A6 and A12, the payoffs corresponding to x in Figure 1 are:
xM ≡ E(ΠM{C1, C2}) ≡ (1− α)[(1 + γ(g))ΠHM − σ(g)FM ], (3a)
xA ≡ E(ΠA{C1, C2}) ≡ α[(1 + γ(g))ΠHM − σ(g)FM ]− cCA − σ(g)FA. (3b)
The system of equations defined by [1], [2] and [3] in Section 3 can be used to
derive the conditions under which each of the three scenarios in the game is a PNE. We
begin by identifying the conditions under which each scenario is a Unique Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (UPNE ) and then consider the case of Multiple Perfect Nash Equilibria
(MPNE ). We will see later that separating the characterisations of PNE in this way
facilitates the policy discussion in Section 6.
UPNE 1. {C1, C2} From Figure 1 this corruption equilibrium requires xA > yA and
xM > zM , hence, respectively, from (1a), (2b), (3a) and (3b):
ϕ(σ) < αFM , (4a)
ω(g) > σ(g). (4b)
Corollary 5. Condition (4a) will be met and the Auditor will support Monopoly cor-
ruption iff σ(g∗∗) > σ(g∗).
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UPNE 2. {C1, H2} This equilibrium involves attempted Monopoly corruption controlled
by the Auditor. In terms of Figure 1 it requires xA < yA and yM > zM , hence, respec-
tively, from (1a), (2a), (2b) and (3b):
ϕ(σ) > αFM , (5a)
ω(g) > 1. (5b)
UPNE 3. {H1, H2}≡ {H1, C2} This ‘honesty’ equilibrium arises under two different
sets of circumstances, if: (i) xA > yA, zM > xM , requiring, respectively (4a) and:
ω(g) < σ(g), (6a)
and (ii) xA < yA, zM > yM , requiring, respectively (5a) and:
ω(g) < 1. (6b)
We now consider the circumstances under which there are MPNE.
MPNE 1. {C1, C2},{C1, H2} From Figure 1 these corruption equilibria require xA =
yA and xM , yM > zM , hence, respectively, from (1a), (2a), (2b), (3a) and (3b):
ϕ(σ) = αFM , (7a)
ω(g) > 1. (7b)
MPNE 2. {C1, C2},{H1, . . .} From Figure 1 these corruption equilibria require xA >
yA and xM = zM , hence, respectively, (4a), and from (1a) and (3a):
ω(g) = σ(g). (8)
MPNE 3. {C1, H2},{H1, . . .} From Figure 1 these corruption equilibria require xA <
yA and yM = zM , hence, respectively, (5a), and from (1a) and (2a):
ω(g) = 1. (9)
MPNE 4. {C1, C2},{C1, H2},{H1, . . .} From Figure 1 these corruption equilibria re-
quire xA = yA and xM = yM = zM , hence, respectively, (7a), and from (8) and (9):
ω(g) = σ(g) = 1. (10)
Lemma 4. MPNE4 is not feasible.
Proof. From Lemma 1(iii) limσ→1− =∞ and hence from Definition 4 σ(g∗∗) < 1 which
contradicts (10).
Remark 4. For completeness, note, there are no pure strategy PNE under xA = yA
where either (i) xM > zM > yM , or (ii) yM > zM > xM .
Remembering that g∗ is not a (continuous) choice variable, there is a clear way of
ranking the three UPNE from a public policy point of view at a given level of g∗. UPNE3
is the most desirable outcome as this involves the guarantee of no corrupt activity.
UPNE1 is clearly the least desirable outcome as corrupt activities may be going on
undetected. UPNE2 is an improvement upon UPNE1 inasmuch as corruption, although
it is not prevented, is detected through the functioning of the Auditor. Similarly, cases
where UPNE2 supports unconstrained corruption may involve very high levels of abuse
which, though not avoided, are detected, whilst unconstrained corruption under UPNE1
may be very high and go undetected.
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Definition 9. Labeling UPNEk (k = 1, 2, 3), corruption equilibria are monotonically
“worsening” [“improving”] in g∗ if increasing g∗ leads to smaller [larger] k for ∀g∗ ∈
(0,∞).
Definition 10. Let small-scale (i) corruption be g∗ that is supported by UPNE1 or
UPNE2 for ∀g∗ ∈ (0, a) (ii) honesty be g∗ that is supported by UPNE3 for ∀g∗ ∈ (0, a),
where a is finite and a ∈ R++.
4 Analysis
In this section we are interested in establishing the conditions under which corruption
might be an equilibrium and even an unconstrained equilibrium. We are also interested
in how these conclusions are affected by changes in the corruption technology and detec-
tion profiles. In particular we will seek to establish whether the equilibria of the model
under a particular technology/detection profile combination is monotonically worsening,
improving or non-monotonic in the level of g∗. However, it is important to be clear about
what we are seeking to establish in this exercise. Given g∗ is an exogenous variable we
are not actually concerned with changes in the level of g∗ as this is not in the gift of
either of the players or the regulatory authority. Instead, “increasing” g∗ is a simple way
of representing local stretching or shrinking of the corruption technology or detection
profile in such a way that the relative position of these functions to the right of g∗ are
shifted downwards to occur at a lower level of g.
We begin the analysis by considering the first corruption technology ωa(g) under
each of the five Cases and then examine how the predictions of the model change by
sequentially introducing technologies ωb(g) and ωc(g).
4.1 Corruption technology a
In this Section we begin to examine each of the Cases under the first corruption tech-
nology ωa(g) and the UPNE that are supported under them. For convenience we refer
to Caseji with Casej, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in accordance with Definition 7 and i ∈ {a, b, c}
refers to the corruption technology profile.
Proposition 1. Case1a supports UPNE2, UPNE3 and MPNE3 depending upon g∗
according to: 
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,H}
{C,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0, g¯)
g∗ = g¯
g∗ ∈ (g¯,∞)
 .
Corollary 6. Case1a (i) supports unconstrained UPNE2 corruption, and, (ii) UPNEk
are monotonically worsening in g∗.
Note, that under Case1a, there is never a possibility of complete regulatory failure:
UPNE1 is never feasible. For sufficiently low g∗, there is no corruption, whilst for
sufficiently high g∗ corruption is chosen by the Monopolist but detected by the Auditor.
We now consider what happens if the detection profile becomes less tough (σ1
stretches to the right) and/or the the rewards to corruption becomes steeper in ac-
cordance with the scenario in Case2a.
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Proposition 2. Case2a supports UPNE1-3 and MPNE2 and MPNE3 depending upon
g∗ according to: 
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,H}
{C,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0,min{g∗∗, g¯})
g∗ = min{g∗∗, g¯}
g∗ ∈ (min{g∗∗, g¯}, g˜)
g∗ = g˜
g∗ ∈ (g˜,∞)
 .
One important thing to note is that the movement from Case1a to Case2a has
introduced the equilibrium UPNE1 under which the regulatory system fails and the
Auditor colludes in the corrupt activity. However, the following Corollary has important
implications for policymakers.
Corollary 7. Case2a (i) supports unconstrained UPNE2 corruption, and, (ii) UPNEk
are non-monotonic in g∗: marginal adjustments in the detection or penalty regimes in-
tended to move the equilibrium from UPNE1 (UPNE2) to UPNE3 may overshoot and
result in UPNE2 (UPNE1).
A further weakening (rightward-stretching) of the detection profile σ1(g) and/or
improvement in the rate of return to corruption ωa(g) results in a movement from
Case2a to Case3a.
Proposition 3. Case3a supports UPNE1 and UPNE2 depending upon g∗, and may
support MPNE1 or UPNE3, MPNE2, and MPNE3 depending upon g∗∗ according to:
g∗∗ < g˜ g∗∗ > g˜
{C,C} {C,C}
{C,C}, {C,H}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,H}
{C,H} {C,H}

if

g∗ ∈ (0, g∗∗)
g˜ < g∗ = g∗∗
g˜ ≥ g∗ = g∗∗
g∗ ∈ (min{g∗∗, g˜}, g˜)
g∗∗ ≤ g∗ = g˜
g∗ ∈ (max{g∗∗, g˜},∞)

.
Corollary 8. Case3a (i) for g∗∗ > g˜ is monotonically improving in g; (ii) for g∗∗ ≥ g˜
is non-monotonic in g, following the same sequence of equilibria as Case2a but for
different reasons; (iii) like Case2a, supports unconstrained UPNE2 corruption.
Proposition 4. (i) Under limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗, Case4a and Case3a are equivalent
(they support the same equilibria under the same conditions - see Proposition 3), and
(ii) Under limg→∞ σ2(g) < σ∗∗, Case4a supports only UPNE1:{
C,C
}
for
{
g∗ ∈ (0,∞) } .
Corollary 9. Case4a under limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ (i) is non-monotonic in g, and, (ii)
supports unconstrained UPNE2 corruption. (iii) Case4a under limg→∞ σ2(g) < σ∗∗,
supports unconstrained and small-scale UPNE1 corruption.
Therefore, even though in Case 4 the detection profile σ2(g) lies everywhere below
probability 1, so long as g∗∗ exists, the outcomes of the model with corruption technology
ωa(g) are exactly the same as under Case 3. However, under Case4a with σ2(g) < σ
∗∗,
{C1, C2} is the only outcome.
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Proposition 5. Case5a under (i) limg→∞ σ2(g) < σ∗∗, supports UPNE1, UPNE3 and
MPNE2 depending upon g∗, according to:
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,C}
{C,C}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0, g¯)
g∗ = g¯
g∗ ∈ (g¯,∞)
 ,
and, under (ii) limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ and g∗∗ < g¯, supports UPNE2, UPNE3 and MPNE3
depending upon g∗, and according to:
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,H}
{C,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0, g˜)
g∗ = g˜
g∗ ∈ (g˜,∞)
 ,
and, under (iii) limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ and g˜ > g∗∗ > g¯, supports UPNE1-3 and MPNE1-3
depending upon g∗, according to:
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,C}
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,H}
{C,H}

if

g∗ ∈ (0, g¯)
g∗ = g¯
g∗ ∈ (g¯, g∗∗)
g∗ = g∗∗
g∗ ∈ (g∗∗, g˜)
g∗ = g˜
g∗ ∈ (g˜,∞)

.
and, under (iv) limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ and g∗∗ > g˜, supports UPNE1-3 and MPNE1 and
MPNE2 depending upon g∗, according to:
{H,H}
{H,H}, {C,C}
{C,C}
{C,C}, {C,H}
{C,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0, g¯)
g∗ = g¯
g∗ ∈ (g¯, g∗∗)
g∗ = g∗∗
g∗ ∈ (g∗∗,∞)
 .
Corollary 10. Case5a (i) supports unconstrained UPNE1 corruption under limg→∞ σ2(g) <
σ∗∗ and unconstrained UPNE2 corruption otherwise, (ii) supports monotonically wors-
ening UPNEk with g∗, under both limg→∞ σ2(g) < σ∗∗ and limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ given
g∗∗ < g¯ and, (iii) is non-monotonic in g∗ for limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ given g∗∗ > g¯.
4.2 Corruption technology b
One of the main characteristics of corruption technology ωa(g) is that, whilst it exhibits
diminishing returns to the scale of corruption g (γ(g) is strictly concave), the diminishing
returns property is insufficiently pronounced to ever cause ωa(g) to become decreasing in
g. We now consider the case of corruption technology ωb(g) under which, for sufficiently
high levels of g∗, ω′a(g) < 0.
Proposition 6. Moving from corruption technology ωa(g) to ωb(g) introduces MPNE3
and UPNE3 at the end of the sequence of equilibria in g∗ under Cases 1 and 2 so
the relevant sequence of equilibria under corruption technology ωb(g) extends those in
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Propositions 1 and 2, and necessarily changes the interval over which UPNE2 exists,
according to: 
...
{C,H}
{C,H}, {H,H}
{H,H}
 if

...
g∗ ∈ (g˜, ˜˜g = g¯)
g∗ = ˜˜g = g¯
g∗ ∈ (˜˜g = g¯,∞)
 .
Corollary 11. Corruption technology ωb(g) (i) rules out unconstrained corruption equi-
libria that prevailed in Cases 1 and 2 under corruption technology ωa(g), (ii) makes Case
1 non-monotonic in g∗, whereas it was monotonically worsening under corruption tech-
nology ωa(g).
Proposition 7. Moving from corruption technology ωa(g) to ωb(g) (i) introduces MPNE3
and UPNE3 at the end of the sequence of equilibria in g∗ under Case3 so the relevant
sequence of equilibria under corruption technology ωb(g) extends those in Proposition 3,
and necessarily changes the interval over which UPNE2 exists, according to:
g∗∗ < g˜ ˜˜g > g∗∗ > g˜
...
...
{C,H}
{C,H}
{C,H}, {H,H} {C,H}, {H,H}
{H,H} {H,H}

if

...
g∗ ∈ (g˜, ˜˜g)
g∗ ∈ (g∗∗, ˜˜g)
g∗ = ˜˜g
g∗ ∈ (˜˜g,∞)

.
and, (ii) for g∗∗ > ˜˜g:
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0,min{g∗∗, g¯})
g∗ = min{g∗∗, g¯}
g∗ ∈ (min{g∗∗, g¯},∞)
 .
Corollary 12. Corruption technology ωb(g): (i) rules out unconstrained corruption
equilibria UPNE2 that prevailed in Case3 under corruption technology ωa(g), and, (ii)
preserves the non-monotonicity of the UPNEk in g∗ under g∗∗ < g˜ and the monotonically
improving UPNEk for g∗∗ > g˜.
Proposition 8. (i) Under limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗, Case 4 and Case 3, with corruption
technology ωb(g), are equivalent (they support the same equilibria under the same condi-
tions - see Proposition 7), and (ii) under limg→∞ σ2(g) < σ∗∗, moving from corruption
technology ωa(g) to ωb(g) introduces MPNE2 and UPNE3 at the end of the sequence
of equilibria in g∗ under Case4 so the relevant sequence of equilibria under corruption
technology ωb(g) extends those in Proposition 4, and necessarily changes the interval
over which UPNE1 exists, according to:
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0, g¯ = g¯)
g∗ = g¯ = g¯
g∗ ∈ (g¯ = g¯,∞)
 .
Corollary 13. Corruption technology ωb(g): (i) rules out unconstrained corruption
equilibria UPNE2 and UPNE1 that prevailed in Case4 under corruption technology
ωa(g), and, (ii) preserves the non-monotonicity of the UPNEk in g∗ under g∗∗ < g˜ and
the monotonically improving UPNEk for g∗∗ > g˜.
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Proposition 9. Moving from corruption technology ωa(g) to ωb(g) under Case5, and
(i) limg→∞ σ2(g) < σ∗∗, introduces MPNE2 and UPNE3 at the end of the sequence
of equilibria in g∗ so the relevant sequence of equilibria under corruption technology
ωb(g) extends those in Proposition 5(i), and necessarily changes the interval over which
UPNE3 exists, according to:
...
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
 if

...
g∗ ∈ (g¯, g¯)
g∗ = g¯
g∗ ∈ (g¯,∞)
 ,
and, under (ii) limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ and g∗∗ < g˜, supports UPNE3 and MPNE3 at
the end of the sequence of equilibria in g∗ so the relevant sequence of equilibria under
corruption technology ωb(g) extends those in Proposition 5(ii) and (iii), and necessarily
changes the interval over which UPNE3 exists, according to:
...
{C,H}
{C,H}, {H,H}
{H,H}
 if

...
g∗ ∈ (g˜, ˜˜g)
g∗ = ˜˜g
g∗ ∈ (˜˜g,∞)
 ,
and, under (iii) limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ and g¯ > g∗∗ > g˜, supports UPNE3 and MPNE3 at
the end of the sequence of equilibria in g∗ so the relevant sequence of equilibria under
corruption technology ωb(g) extends those in Proposition 5(iv), and necessarily changes
the interval over which UPNE2 exists, according to:
˜˜g < g∗∗ < g˜ g¯ > g∗∗ > ˜˜g
...
...
{C,H}
{C,H}
{C,H}, {H,H}
{C,H}, {H,H}
{H,H}
{H,H}

if

...
g∗ ∈ (g∗∗, ˜˜g)
g∗ ∈ (g∗∗, g¯)
g∗ = ˜˜g
g∗ = g¯
g∗ ∈ (˜˜g,∞)
g∗ ∈ (g¯,∞)

.
and, under (iv) limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ and g¯ < g∗∗, supports UPNE3 and MPNE3 at
the end of the sequence of equilibria in g∗ so the relevant sequence of equilibria under
corruption technology ωb(g) is exactly in accordance with part (i) of this Proposition.
4.3 Corruption technology c
Finally, we consider corruption technology ωc(g), which unlike technologies a b, has
such strongly diminishing returns to corruption that ωc(g) never reaches unity - which,
of course, means that Auditor honesty will immediately rule out any corruption by the
Monopolist.
Proposition 10. Moving from corruption technology ωa(g) or ωb(g) to ωc(g) under (i)
Case1 results in universal UPNE3:{
H,H
}
for
{
g∗ ∈ (0,∞) } ,
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(ii) Case2 results in the sequence of equilibria in g∗:
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0,min{g¯, g∗∗})
g∗ = min{g¯, g∗∗}
g∗ ∈ (min{g¯, g∗∗},∞)
 .
Corollary 14. Corruption technology ωc(g) (i) rules out the non-monotonic sequence
of equilibria in g∗ under Case1b, and preserves the monotonically improving sequence
of equilibria in g∗ in Case2a and Case2b.
Proposition 11. Under limg→∞ σ2(g) < σ∗∗, Case4c (Case5c) is equivalent to Case4a
(Case5a) supporting universal UPNE1 (unconstrained UPNE1).
Corollary 15. Unconstrained UPNE1 is feasible with corruption technology ωc(g) under
Case4.
Proposition 12. Under limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ (i) Case4c supports the sequence of equi-
libria under g∗, according to:
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0, g∗∗)
g∗ = g∗∗
g∗ ∈ (g∗∗,∞)
 .
(ii) Case5c supports the sequence of equilibria under g∗, according to:
g∗∗ ≤ g¯ g∗∗ > g¯
{H,H} {H,H}
{H,H}, {C,C}
{C,C}
{C,C}, {H,H}
{H,H} {H,H}
 if

g∗ ∈ (0,min{g∗∗, g¯})
g∗ = g¯ < g∗∗
g∗ ∈ (g¯, g∗∗)
g∗ = g∗∗ > g¯
g∗ ∈ (g∗∗,∞)
 .
Corollary 16. For limg→∞ σ2(g) > σ∗∗ Corruption technology ωc(g) (i) rules out un-
constrained corruption equilibrium UPNE2 under Cases 4 and 5 that prevailed under
ωa(g) (ii) eliminates non-monotonicity under Case4 that prevailed under ωa(g) and ωb(g)
(iii) preserves non-monotonicity under Case5 that prevailed under ωa(g) and ωb(g) for
g∗∗ > g¯.
5 Policy Options
In this section we consider how the parameters of the model may be manipulated so as
to change the outcome of the game for a given prospect g∗. We begin by asking whether
the Monopolist can influence the outcome of the game. Given we are assuming that the
Monopolist cannot determine the level of corruption, the only other candidate for an
instrument that the Monopolist might exploit is α.1
Proposition 13. If ω(g∗) > σ(g∗) and σ(g∗) is greater than, but sufficiently close to,
σ(g∗∗) then the monopolist can increase α (the share of profit devoted to Auditor services)
strategically to move from UPNE2 to UPNE1.
1It is conceivable that the Monopolist might be able to influence the profile γ(g). However, in order
to analyse this we would require a formal specification of the costs involved and this lies beyond the
scope of the current work.
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Proof. Let ω(g∗) at some initial level of α be ω(g∗, α) where ω(g∗, α) > σ(g∗). Accord-
ingly, let σ(g∗) > σ(g∗∗, α) so that we have UPNE2 at α. Increasing α shifts αFM (in
Figure 2) to the left raising σ(g∗∗). However, given ω(g∗, α) > σ(g∗), it follows there
exists some ∆α > 0 such that ω(g∗, α+ ∆α) > σ(g∗). If σ(g∗∗, α) is sufficiently close to
σ(g∗), then σ(g∗∗, α+ ∆α) < σ(g∗), hence yielding UPNE1.
Definition 11. If it exists, let ∆α > 0 be the value of ∆α which satisfies both σ(g∗∗, α+
∆α) < σ(g∗) and ω(g∗, α+ ∆α) > σ(g∗), where ω(g∗, α) > σ(g∗) and σ(g∗) > σ(g∗∗, α).
Hence, if ∆α exists then it is possible for the Monopolist to move the game from
UPNE2 to UPNE1. It follows that the Monopolist may be able to exploit consultancy
fees to ‘bribe’ the Auditor to be complicit in its corruption. However, although UPNE1
may be ‘better’ than UPNE2 for the Monopolist, inasmuch as it moves the Monopolist
from a situation of incurring the fine FM with certainty, to incurring it with some
positive probability σ(g∗) < 1,2 the above Proposition only establishes that there are
circumstances under which it might bring about such manipulation of the Auditor. We
now address the question regarding the conditions under which such manipulation would
be in the interests of the Monopolist.
Proposition 14. The Monopolist optimally selects to increase α by an amount ∆α in
order to bring about a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 if:
∆α <
(1− α)(1− σ(g))FM
{(1 + γ(g))piHM − σ(g)FM}
(11)
Proof. It is required to show that the (risk-neutral) Monopolist’s expected profit under
UPNE1 with α + ∆α is greater than the Monopolist’s profit under UPNE2 with α.
Replacing α in (3a) with α+ ∆α and comparing with (2a) we have (11).
Definition 12. Let ∆α ≡ (1−α)(1−σ(g))FM
(1+γ(g))piHM−σ(g)FM
.
Lemma 5. Although it is possible for the denominator of (11) to be non-positive, for
{C1, C2} to be a UPNE requires that (1 + γ(g))piHM − σ(g)FM > 0, hence where the
strategy of using α to move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 is feasible, then the denominator
of (11) is positive.
Proof. From (4b) UPNE1 requires that ω(g) > σ(g), hence
piHM
FM
γ(g) > σ(g). Multiplying
by FM and rearranging, we have γ(g)pi
H
M − σ(g)FM > 0, hence 1 + γ(g)piHM − σ(g)FM >
0.
Remark 5. If ∆α ∈ (0,∆α) then the Monopolist can and will optimally raise α to move
the game from UPNE2 to UPNE1.
Proposition 15. The range of values of ∆α which are consistent with the Monopolist
optimally choosing to stimulate a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1, ∆α ∈ (0,∆α), is (i)
decreasing in α, piHM and γ(g), (ii) increasing in FM and (iii) may be increasing or
decreasing in σ(g).
2By definition, under UPNE1, σ(g∗) < σ(g∗∗) < 1.
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Proof. (i) This follows directly from the observation that −α appears only in the nu-
merator of (11) whilst γ(g) and piHM both appear only in the denominator of (11) with
positive coefficients, hence the respective partial derivatives of ∆α in each Case are
negative. (ii) This follows given, after some manipulation:
∂∆α
∂FM
=
(1− α)(1− σ(g))[(1 + γ(g))piHM ]
{.}2 > 0,
where {.} is the denominator in (11), and given the assumptions of the model, the
numerator of the derivative is positive. (iii) Given:
∂∆α
∂σ(g)
=
(1− σ(g))− [(1 + γ(g))piHM − σ(g)FM ]
{.}2 ,
the first term in the numerator (1 − σ(g)) is non-negative by the assumptions of the
model and [.] is also positive from Lemma 5.
It follows that subject to UPNE1 and UPNE2 both being feasible following an in-
crease in FM , such an increase in the fine to the Monopolist will increase the range
of values of ∆α which would make a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 attractive to the
Monopolist. As we will see later, such an increase in FM will also have a perverse effect
on the Auditor which reinforces the likelihood of a move from UPNE2 to UPNE1 being
feasible and optimal.
We now ask whether the regulatory body can influence the outcome of the game.
The two obvious factors that the regulator can manipulate are the fines (to the Audi-
tor (FA) and the Monopolist (FM ) in the scenario where corruption is detected) and
the probability of detection (by investing in the detection framework). We begin by
examining the impact upon the game of raising the penalty to the Monopolist, FM .
Proposition 16. Increasing the Monopolist’s fine under detected corruption, FM (i)
can eliminate all corruption with a sufficiently high fine, (ii) can, perversely, incentivise
UPNE1 over UPNE2.
Proof. (i) For {C1, C2} to be UPNE requires, from (4a), that ω(g) ≡ γ(g)pi
H
M
FM
> σ(g) and
for {C1, H2} to be UPNE requires, from (5b), that ω(g) ≡ γ(g)pi
H
M
FM
> 1. Hence, to rule
out UPNE1 and UPNE2, respectively requires that σ(g)FM > pi
H
M and FM > pi
H
M . (ii)
Let ω(g) at some initial level of FM be ω(g, FM ), where ω(g, FM ) > σ(g). Accordingly,
let σ(g∗) > σ(g∗∗, FM ) so that we have UPNE2. Increasing FM shifts αFM in Figure
2 to the left raising σ(g∗∗). However, given ω(g∗, FM ) > σ(g∗), it follows there exists
some ∆FM > 0 such that ω(g
∗, FM + ∆FM ) > σ(g∗). If σ(g∗∗, FM ) is sufficiently close
to σ(g∗), then σ(g∗∗, FM + ∆FM ) < σ(g∗), hence yielding UPNE1.
Essentially, Proposition 16(i) refers to a case where ω(g) is lowered sufficiently that
the corruption profile resembles Case1c: for g ∈ (0,∞), ω(g) < σ(g).
Corollary 17. UPNEk can be non-monotonic in FM .
Corollary 18 is a warning that increasing the fine to the Monopolist on detection of
corruption may have perverse effects if the fine is not set sufficiently high.
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Corollary 18. The regulatory authority can bring about a move from UPNE1 to UPNE2,
causing the Auditor to be honest instead of supporting Monopoly corruption, by decreas-
ing the monopoly penalty, FM .
We now examine the implications for the game of the regulator increasing the fine
to the Auditor with corruption detected under UPNE1.
Proposition 17. Increasing the fine to the Auditor, FA, on detection of UPNE1 cor-
ruption (i) unambiguously reduces the range of g∗ over which the Auditor will choose to
be complicit in corrupt activities, promoting UPNE2 over UPNE1, (ii) cannot eliminate
UPNE2.
Proof. (i) This follows straightforwardly from Definition 2. Increasing FA raises ϕ(σ)
for ∀σ ∈ (0, 1). Since, from (4a), UPNE1 requires that ϕ(σ) < αFM , increasing ϕ(σ)
reduces σ(g∗∗), the supremum of the set of σ(g) for which the Auditor would support
Monopoly corruption. (ii) This follows straightforwardly from the observation that FA
does not feature in the Monopolist’s condition for UPNE2.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the regulator could invest in improving the
corruption detection framework, raising σ(g).
A 13. We assume, for simplicity, that investments in improving the corruption detection
framework cause the profile σ(g) to rise ∀g ∈ (0, gˆ) [∀g ∈ (0,∞)]in the case of σ1 [σ2]
so that the properties of the profile under A10 are preserved.
Corollary 19. (i) If T > σ∗∗ so that g∗∗ does not exist, then a sufficiently large invest-
ment in improving detection will eventually yield T < σ∗∗ for which there will exist an
associated g∗∗. (ii) Investment in improving detection cannot convert a σ2(g) detection
profile into a σ1(g) profile.
Lemma 6. Under σ1 and also σ2 for T > S, g
∗∗ exists and any investment in improving
the detection of corruption in accordance with A10 will lower the level of g∗∗.
Proof. For this proof it is convenient to exploit the strict monotonicity of σ(g) (σ′(g) > 0)
for σ ∈ [0, 1) [σ ∈ (0,∞)] under σ1 [σ2]. This allows us to invert the function giving
g(σ) for σ1 ∈ [0, 1) and σ2 ∈ [0, T ). Under σ1, σ(g∗∗) ∈ (0, 1) exists and under σ2 with
T > S, σ(g∗∗) ∈ (0, T ) exists . Hence, inverting the function we can say in each case
g(σ∗∗) exists. Given σ∗∗ is determined by the interaction of ϕ(σ) and αFM , neither of
which are affected by raising the σ(g) profile, then σ∗∗ is constant. However, an upward
shift in σ1(g) for σ ∈ (0, 1) implies g(σ∗∗), and hence g∗∗, falls. A similar argument
holds for an upward shift in σ2 for σ ∈ (0, T ).
We begin by considering the impact of investing in improved detection upon the
Auditor.
Proposition 18. Investment in corruption detection (i) under σ1, and also σ2 for
T > S, unambiguously reduces the range of g∗ for which the Auditor will choose to be
complicit in corrupt activities, promoting UPNE2 over UPNE1, (ii) under σ2 in the case
of T ≤ S will reduce the range of g∗ for which the Auditor will choose to be complicit if
the shift in σ2 is sufficiently large.
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Proof. (i) Given Lemma 6 Since the Auditor’s complicity in corruption requires that
g∗ ∈ (0, g∗∗) the range of values of g∗ consistent with Auditor complicity has fallen. (ii)
It is sufficient to note that under σ2 in the case of T ≤ S, σ∗∗ lies strictly above σ2
∀g ∈ [0,∞), hence g∗∗ does not exist. However, since σ∗∗ is fixed and lies in the open
interval (0, 1) there always exists a σ > σ∗∗ in the interval (0, 1). Hence, a sufficiently
large investment in improving detection will eventually shift σ2 upwards raising T above
S so that g∗∗ exists. This reduces the interval of g∗ under which the Auditor will be
complicit in corruption from (0,∞) to (0, g∗∗). Further improvements in corruption
detection will then have the effect described in (i).
It follows that investments in improving corruption detection may have no effect upon
the Auditor unless they are sufficiently large, hence local adjustments in the detection
may not have any impact upon the the range of g∗ supporting UPNE2. We now turn
our attention to the impact of investments in corruption detection on the Monopolist.
Proposition 19. Investments in improving corruption detection, however large, are
completely ineffective at eliminating Monopoly corruption or even reducing the range of
g∗ for which the Monopolist is corrupt where corruption arises under technologies a and
b in the region ωa > 1 or ωb > 1.
Proof. This follows straight forwardly from the observation that UPNE2 requires ω > σ
but since ω > 1 and σ is constrained to lie at or below 1, any feasible increase in σ will
not be enough to reverse the inequality between σ and ω.
Corollary 20. Investments in improving corruption detection are completely ineffective
at addressing unconstrained UPNE2 under technology ωa.
Thus, whilst improving detection may deter the Auditor from being complicit in
corrupt activities, on its own, this policy cannot eliminate all corruption, including
possible unconstrained corruption. Also, we know from Proposition18 that such invest-
ments will eventually deter the Auditor from supporting corrupt activities, hence the
most that could be achieved with this policy of improving corruption detection is to
eliminate UPNE1. UPNE2 cannot be eliminated in this case, however much investment
is undertaken.
Remark 6. In line with A10, sufficiently large investments in improving corruption
detection will eventually raise σ1(g) transforming Case3 into Case2 and Case2 into
Case1. Similarly, investments will eventually raise σ2(g) transforming Case4 into Case5.
Proposition 20. If investments in improving corruption detection, required to bring
about a change in Case as described in Remark6, are prohibitively expensive, improving
corruption detection will not eliminate small-scale UPNE1 in Case2, Case3 and Case4.
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of small-scale corruption and the observa-
tion that Cases2-4 support UPNE1 small-scale corruption since in each case σ′(0) <
ω′(0).
We now examine some of the characteristics of the 5 Cases in terms of the role that
investments in detection improvement can have on deterring Monopoly corruption. We
use the idea of arbitrarily small changes in corruption detection investment in order to
emphasise that after the investment the local properties of the model are unchanged
and we have not made a shift from one Case to another.
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Proposition 21. (i) Investments in improving corruption detection are completely in-
effective in dealing with Monopolist corruption in Case1. (ii) Under Case2, arbitrarily
small investments in improving corruption technology will always reduce the range of g∗
for which the Monopolist chooses to be corrupt.
Proof. (i) This follows directly from the fact that under Case1 the only corrupt equilib-
rium is UPNE2 where ωa > 1 or ωb > 1, which, from Proposition19, we know cannot
be affected by detection investments. (ii) First, if g∗∗ > g¯ then Monopolist corruption
occurs if g∗ ∈ (0, g¯). Investing in improving corruption detection will raise σ1(g) hence
reducing g¯ and with it the upper limit of g∗ consistent with Monopolist corruption. Sec-
ond, if g∗∗ ≤ g¯ then Monopolist corruption occurs if g∗ ∈ (0, g∗). Investing in improving
corruption detection raises σ1(g), which by Lemma6 reduces g
∗∗, and with it the upper
limit of g∗ consistent with Monopolist corruption.
Finally, we note that unlike Case1 where corruption detection was completely inef-
fective at deterring Monopoly corruption, and Case2 where, regardless of the corruption
technology, such investments would always reduce the range of g∗ under which the Mo-
nopolist would be corrupt, we have that Cases3-5 each have conditions under which
improving corruption detection would and would not have benefits in terms of reducing
the range of g∗ consistent with Monopolist corruption. For brevity, the following Propo-
sition identifies the Cases where local improvements in the corruption detection do not
impact upon Monopolist corruption.
Proposition 22. Arbitrarily small improvements in corruption detection do not reduce
the range of g∗ under which the Monopolist is corrupt (i) under Case3a and Case3b if
g˜ < g∗∗ ≤ ˜˜g, (ii) under Case4a and Case 4c if T < σ∗∗ and T < S < σ∗∗, respectively,
(iii) under Case4a and Case4b if T > σ∗∗ and respectively g∗∗ > g˜, g∗∗ > g˜, (iv) under
Case5a and Case5b if T > σ∗∗ and g¯ > g∗∗, (v) under Case5c if σ∗∗ > T > S, T > σ∗∗
or finally S > T > σ∗∗ and g¯ ≥ g∗∗.
Proof.
6 Conclusions
This paper has had two broad objectives. First, to develop a model of firm corruption,
taking account of auditor interaction, and to use this model to identify the possibil-
ity of stable corruption, where stability is viewed as an equilibrium in the game. The
key driver to the relationship between the firm and the auditor is that increasing firm
profitability, from corruption, indirectly increases the demand for consultancy services
that the auditor provides in addition to auditing services. It has been shown here that
a variety of equilibria are possible in the game, depending on particular parameterisa-
tions: corruption by both the firm and the auditor; firm corruption that is controlled by
an honest auditor; multiple equilibria involving both corruption and honesty; honesty
by both actors in the model. The multiplicity of possible equilibria in the model is
interesting in its own right but is particularly useful in terms of the analysis of possible
policy interventions that are considered in the final substantive section. This analysis
of policy is the second broad objective of the discussion. In general terms some of the
policy conclusions confirm what might be considered intuitively obvious anti-corruption
policies. But some of the conclusions are less intuitively obvious and reflect firm-auditor
interaction. The model has the property that it is possible to eliminate firm corruption
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by heavy monopoly penalties. This is a draconian policy that can imply closing firms
down. This of course occurs in practice but is by no means universal. If penalties on
firms are less than that necessary to close firms down, which is also the case in practice,
a series of interesting policy conclusions can be derived from the model developed here.
First, the monopolist can, in principle, ’bribe’ the auditor by increasing consultancy
payments. The result here is that the equilibrium of the game can, in principle, be
shifted from “firm corruption that is controlled by an honest auditor” to “corruption by
both the firm and the auditor”. Secondly, even without the firm strategically buying
consultancy services, increasing penalties on corrupt firms can be shown to undermine
auditor honesty; a conclusion that follows from the interactions in the model. It follows
that the efficiency of the auditing system may be improved by reducing penalties on
corrupt firms.
It follows from these conclusions that unless anti-corruption polices are based on
closing down corrupt firms, any penalties on corrupt firms are an inefficient policy op-
tion and should be used in combination with, or replaced by, other policy options. First
there is the obvious option of punishing auditors. It has been shown here that this
unambiguously promotes auditor honesty and does not have the perverse effects that
can be identified when corrupt monopolists are punished. But auditor punishment does
not remove firm corruption instead it results in a more effective auditing system. It
follows that possible anti-social effects of corruption not considered here (for instance
on consumers or other economic actors) still exist. A similar conclusion follows from
investment in the detection of firm corruption. This can be shown to not eliminate
corruption instead it promotes auditor honesty. It is appropriate to mention, here in the
conclusion, various policy options that appear intuitively plausible but go beyond the
confines of the model presented here. First, there is the possibility of making penalties
endogenous and hence increasing with corrupt gains. This might eventually eliminate
large scale corruption, but depending on the function used to define the penalties need
not eliminate the perverse impacts of firm penalties in general. An interesting issue
is when dual equilibria exist. This suggests that corruption might be understood as a
focal point; the fact that it exists does not imply that non-corruption can also exist
even with the same Monopoly and Auditor payoff structures. This possibility suggests
anti-corruption policies that are beyond the framework developed here and might re-
volve round the expectations of the actors. One final issue that can be highlighted
involves the non-monotonicity of the equilibria. It is clear from the analysis presented
here that large-scale policy interventions, involving (for example) politically motivated
policies aimed at ‘getting tough’ on corruption, may leap-frog the desired outcome and
be counterproductive.
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